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Abstract: In this paper we introduce a new approach to representing both
TU-games and NTU-games as special economic structures. Instead of represent-
ing a game as a market – an exchange economy with concave utility functions –
as in the extant literature, we represent an arbitrary game as a coalition produc-
tion economy with a public good. The economy provides an indirect description
of the game. Our model uses the idea of a social planner or arbitrager who,
through arbitrage on productive activities, seeks to minimize the net cost of
providing the public good subject to the constraint that the society satis…es
its reservation welfare level. Note that in constrast to the prior literature on
representing games as economic structures, we require neither that the game be
balanced nor that there are large numbers of players. Our approach to repre-
senting a game as an economic structure uses techniques from consumer demand
theory and, in particular, the notion of a compensated demand correspondence.
The main results of this paper exhibit a relationship between cooperative game
theory and consumer demand theory.
1 Introduction
In this paper we introduce a new approach to representing games with and
without side payments, respectively, TU and NTU games, as special economic
structures. These special economic structures are coalition production economies
with a public good. A coalition production economy consists of a set of produc-
tive sectors that can produce either a single good or a number of di¤erentiated
goods. Associated to this economy there is a public good that a¤ects the produc-
tivity of the sectors. (Imagine, for example, that this public good is aggregate
employment.) We de…ne a social welfare function for the society. A social
planner plays the role of an arbitrager. The social planner organizes the pro-
duction/consumption of the sectors according to a given vector of prices and
costs and seeks to minimize the net production cost of the public good, provided
that the society satis…es its reservation utility level. This minimization problem
is called the social planner’s problem.
From the perspective of cooperative game theory, the interest of our eco-
nomic structures comes from the links that will be established between coalition
production economies and cooperative games in characteristic form. Di¤erent
examples of the construction of particular coalition production economies from
any given TU or NTU game are studied in this paper. Our approach to repre-
senting a game as a coalition economic structure uses techniques from consumer
demand theory. In particular the notion of a compensated demand correspon-
dence and of an expenditure function are used in this paper for the reinterpre-
tation of a game from a new economic point of view.1 The main result of this
paper exhibits a link between compensated demand correspondences that solve
social planner’s problems with best coalitions correspondences associated to the
1We refer the reader to [10] for an excellent introduction to these concepts.
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indirect functions of games.
From cooperative game theory, indirect functions and best coalitions corre-
spondences of TU-games and NTU-games, introduced in [8] and [11], respec-
tively, are the basic tools to be used through all the paper. These functions and
their associated best coalitions correspondences provide dual representations of
games; they contain the same information as the corresponding characteristic
functions.
The reader will observe that although we follow a di¤erent approach to those
of Shapley and Shubik [12], Billera [1] and Billera and Bixby [2], we are building
on ideas in those papers: economic structures induce games and games induce
special economic structures. To obtain an equivalence between games and mar-
kets, the prior papers require totally balancedness; this is not the case in our
paper since games and coalition production economies that are derived from
games contain essentially the same information. We also note that we do not
require that there be large numbers of players, as in [15] and [16], for example.
Our approach appears to be quite distinct from any in the prior literature.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. The de…nition of the spe-
cial economic structure, the coalition production economy with a public good,
and that of the associated social planner’s problem on this economy are given
in Section 2. The next section introduces some general de…nitions on both TU
and NTU games. Particular examples of coalition production economies de-
rived from games are studied in this section and the relationship between both
structures is shown; in particular, compensated demand correspondences of so-
cial planner’s problems are related to best coalitions correspondences. Di¤erent
numerical examples are sketched through all this section.
2 Games with or without Transferable Utility
Let N be a …nite set, called the set of players, with cardinality greater than
or equal to 2. A subset S of N is called a coalition. A game with transferable
utility, a TU-game, is a pair (N ; v) where v : 2N ! R is a real valued func-
tion, called the characteristic function of the game, de…ned on the power set of
N: Typically, it is required that v(;) = 0. A TU-game (N ; v) is monotone if
8S;T ½ N such that S ½ T , we have v(S) · v(T ):
An NTU-game, or a game with non transferable utility, is a pair (N; V )
where V is a correspondence, called the characteristic correspondence, assigning
a subset V (S) ½ RS to each coalition S ½ N , such that
(a) V (S) is nonempty closed and convex for all S,
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(b) fx j x 2 V (S) and xi ¸ y; 8i 2 S; 8y 2 V (fig)g is bounded for all S.
We can consider V (S) as a subset of RN by putting zeros in the coordinates
that refer to players that are in N n S; thus, for every S ½ N , we denote by
V 0(S) the following set:
V 0(S) =
©
x 2 RN : xS 2 V (S); xNnS = 0
ª
:
An NTU-game (N ;V ) is comprehensive if for each coalition S and each
vector x in V (S), if z · x then z 2 V (S): A game (N ;V ) is compactly generated
if there exists some compact subset - of RN such that, for each coalition S
and for each allocation x in V (S), there exists some allocation y in - such that
(yi)i2S 2 V (S) and xi · yi for every player i in S. In this case we say that -
(compactly) generates (N ;V ). An NTU-game (N; V ) is monotone if 8S;T ½ N
such that S ½ T , we have that 8x 2 V (S) the allocation y such that yS = x
and yTnS = 0 belongs to V (T ).
The indirect function of a TU-game (N ; v) is the function ¼ : RN ! R
de…ned by
¼(w) = max
S½N
(
v(S) ¡ X
i2S
wi
)
; 8w 2 RN : (1)
A coalition T ½ N is said to be a best coalition for w 2 RN if it solves the
preceding maximization problem, i.e., if it satis…es
¼(w) = v(T ) ¡ X
i2T
wi:
In [8] it is shown that the indirect function provides a dual representation of
a TU-game: each TU-game (N ; v) can be recovered from its indirect function ¼
by
v(S) = min
w2RN
(
¼(w) +
X
i2S
wi
)
; 8S ½ N:
The best coalitions correspondence © : RN !! 2N is de…ned to be the
mapping assigning to each w 2 RN the set of all best coalitions for w:
©(w) =
½
T ½ N : ¼(w) = v(T ) ¡ P
i2T
wi
¾
;
8w 2 RN :
Note that this set is always nonempty because of the de…nition of the indirect
function in (1).
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On the other hand, the concept of indirect function for compactly generated
and comprehensive NTU-games was introduced in [11] for its dual representa-
tion. The indirect function ¼ : RN++ £RN ¡! R of a compactly generated and
comprehensive NTU-game (N ;V ) is de…ned by
¼(¸;w) = max
S½N; x2V (S)
(X
i2S
(¸ixi ¡ wi)
)
; 8(¸;w) 2 RN++ £ RN :
It is shown in [11] that the indirect function ¼ of a compactly generated
and comprehensive NTU-game (N ;V ) contains all the information on the game
itself. For any NTU-game the characteristic correspondence can be recovered
by its indirect function ¼ by
V (S) =
(
y 2 RS : X
i2S
(¸iyi ¡ wi) · ¼(¸; w); 8(¸; w) 2 RN++ £ RN
)
; 8S ½ N:
Similarly to the TU case, a coalition T ½ N is said to be a best coalition for
(¸;w) 2 RN++ £ RN if there exists some x 2 V (T ), called a best production, for
T ½ N such that
¼(¸;w) =
X
i2T
(¸ixi ¡ wi):
The best coalitions correspondence © : RN++ £RN !! RN £ 2N associated
to the NTU-game (N ;V ) is the mapping assigning to each (¸; w) 2 RN++ £RN
the set of all pairs of best coalitions with their associated best productions:
©(¸;w) =
(
(T; x0) 2 2N £ RN : x0 2 V 0(T ); ¼(¸;w) = X
i2T
(¸ix0i ¡ wi)
)
; 8(¸; w) 2 RN++ £ RN :
Note that this correspondence takes nonempty values; the reason for this
nonemptiness follows from the de…nition of the indirect function and from the
fact that we are considering compactly generated and comprehensive NTU-
games.
For the case of monotone games it is shown in [8] and [11] that we only need
to know the restriction to RN+ of the indirect function for representing the initial
game. We can recover a monotone TU-game (N ; v) from its indirect function
by
v(S) = min
w2RN+
(
¼(w) +
X
i2S
wi
)
; 8S ½ N; (2)
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for a monotone, compactly generated and comprehensive NTU-game (N ;V ),
one has
V (S) =
(
y 2 RS : X
i2S
(¸iyi ¡ wi) · ¼(¸; w); 8(¸; w) 2 RN++ £ RN+
)
; 8S ½ N ;
in the latter case, since the indirect function is homogeneous of degree 1 we can
write
V (S) =
(
y 2 RS : X
i2S
(¸iyi ¡ wi) · ¼(¸;w); 8(¸;w) 2 ¢
)
; 8S ½ N;
where
¢ =
(
(¸; w) 2 RN++ £ RN+ :
nX
i=1
(¸i + wi) = 1
)
: (3)
3 Coalition Production Economies
3.1 Coalition Production Economies with a Public Good
We de…ne a coalition production economy as an economy with a set N =
f1; 2; :::; ng of productive sectors that produce/consume collectively some output
y 2 R of a good that can be sold (or, if y is negative, bought) at unitary price. A
coalition production economy with a public good is a coalition production econ-
omy where the productivity of coalitions depends on a certain quantity t of a
public good that will be consumed by the society; it is assumed that this good
is in the interval [0; 1]. Formally, associated to a coalition production economy
with a public good is a production function
¹ : [0; 1] £ 2N ! R
such that, for each t 2 [0; 1] and S 2 2N (2N denotes the power set2 of N),
¹(t; S) speci…es the amount of the good that can be produced by the productive
sectors in S for a certain quantity t of the public good. This production function
is assumed to satisfy ¹(t; ;) = 0:
2The power set of a set F is
2F = fS : S ½ Fg :
6
The cost of having a productive sector i 2 N at full activity is an exogenous
…xed cost denoted by wi 2 R+. The net cost of the economic activity is given
by a function
c : RN+ £ [0; 1] £ 2N £ R+ ! R:
For each w 2 RN+ , t 2 [0; 1], S 2 2N and x 2 R+, c(w; t; S; y) is the di¤erence
between the cost of the activity of the sectors in S and the income received from
selling an output y:
It is assumed that the society is socially homogeneous, that is, the prefer-
ences of all individuals can be represented by the same utility function. The
members of the society only care about the amount of the public good they can
consume. Because of social homogeneity, the utility function U of any individ-
ual can be taken as a social welfare function; this accords with the unanimity
property of social choice theory.
Associated with any coalition production economy with a public good there is
a social planner who hires productive sectors and organizes production/consumption
to minimize net costs while providing a certain reservation level of utility u0.
Formally, for given costs w 2 RN+ and reservation utility u0, the social planner’s
problem is written as follows:8>>><>>:
min c(w; t; S; ¹(t; S))
s:t:
t 2 [0; 1];
S ½ N;
U(t) ¸ u0:
Note that for this minimization problem w and u0 are exogenously given to the
social planner.
The minimum expenditure or minimum net cost for this problem is repre-
sented by the function e : [0; 1] £ RN+ ! R de…ned by
e(u0; w) = inf fc(w; t; S; ¹(t; S)) : t 2 [0; 1]; S ½ N; U(t) ¸ u0g ; 8(u0; w) 2 [0; 1] £ RN+ :
The mapping ¾ : [0; 1]£RN+ !! [0; 1]£ 2N assigning to each pair (u0; w) 2
[0; 1]£RN+ the set of arguments that solve the social planner’s problem is called
the compensated demand correspondence:
¾(u0; w) =©
(t; S) 2 [0; 1] £ 2N : U(t) ¸ u0 and e(u0; w) = c(w; t; S; ¹(t; S))ª ;
8(u0; w) 2 [0; 1] £ RN+ :
(4)
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3.2 The Family of Games Induced by a Coalition Produc-
tion Economy
Associated to the coalition production economy with a public good is a family
of games that contains the rules of the interaction across productive sectors.
For a given t the production function ¹ induces the following (induced) family
of games in characteristic form f(N ; v¹;t)gt2[0;1] ; where
v¹;t(S) = ¹(t; S):
The interest of these induced games will be explained later on; it will be
shown that for particular models of coalition production economies that are
induced by an initially given game, there is a game in the induced family that
coincides with the initial one.
3.3 Coalition Production Economies with Di¤erentiated
Production and a Public Good
By making few changes in the coalition production economy with one produced
good model, it is possible to describe general situations where each productive
sector in N produces a di¤erentiated good. The following three new modi…ca-
tions of the initial model fully describe the di¤erentiated production case:
(a) The production function ¹ is a correspondence into RN : ¹(t; S) is now
a subset of RN for each t 2 [0; 1] and S ½ N .
(b) Each di¤erentiated good can be sold according to an exogenous vector of
prices ¸ 2 RN+ . If productive sector i 2 N produces a certain good, each unit
of this good can be sold at price ¸i 2 R+.
(c) Apart from the selection of the productive sectors S ½ N and the selec-
tion of the public good t 2 [0; 1], in this model the social planner has another
argument in the minimization problem: the planner must choose the optimal
vector of outputs x0 2 RN in ¹(t; S).
The fact that each produced good can be sold at possibly di¤erent prices
makes the net cost function dependent on the exogenous price vector ¸ 2 RN+ .
The net cost of the economic activity in the di¤erentiated case is given by the
function
c : RN+ £ RN+ £ [0; 1] £ 2N £ RN ! R
where, for each ¸ 2 RN+ , w 2 RN+ , t 2 [0; 1], S 2 2N and x0 2 ¹(t; S),
c(¸;w; t; S; x0) is the di¤erence between the cost of the activity of the sectors in
S and the income received from the collective production of x0.
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Since no other changes are introduced in the model, the social planner’s
problem for given prices ¸ 2 RN+ , costs w 2 RN+ and reservation utility u0 is
written as follows: 8>>>><>>>:
min c(¸;w; t; S; x0)
s:t:
t 2 [0; 1];
S ½ N;
x0 2 ¹(t; S);
U(t) ¸ u0:
Note that for this minimization problem ¸, w and u0 are exogenously given to
the social planner while t, S and x0 are endogenous.
The same considerations can be made when describing the family of games
that is implicit in this economic structure. For a given t, the production function
¹ induces the following family of NTU-games in characteristic form:
f(N ;V¹;t)gt2[0;1] ;
where
V¹;t(S) = ¹(t; S) ½ RS :
In the next section we will study the relationship between these games and the
games that induce some special coalition production economies.
4 Coalition Production Economies Induced by
Games
4.1 Coalition Production Economies Induced by TU-Games
Typically, for an initially given monotone TU-game (N ; v), we de…ne a coalition
production economy with a public good where the set N represents a set of
industrial sectors in a society and the level of employment of the workers in this
sectors is the public good associated to the economy (if t = 0 nobody in the
society is working and if t = 1 all society is fully employed).
If v(S) represents the amount of the good that can be jointly produced by the
industries in coalition S ½ N when all workers are employed in these industries
then, for some other …xed level of employment t 2 [0; 1], the production of
the good by S is assumed to be proportional to the level of employment; the
production function of the coalition production economy is given by
¹(t; S) = tv(S):
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Consequently, if wi denotes the cost of production for industry i 2 N then when
the level of employment is t the cost of production is twi:
The workers are paid for their work in the industrial sectors with a …xed
salary. If ®, which is assumed to be a real value greater than v (N), denotes the
total amount of money that the industrial planner pays to the workers when
they are all employed then, for some other level of employment t, the cost of
all salaries is equal to ®t. For simplicity, it is assumed that the social welfare
function U on the public good is the identity:
U(t) = t; 8t 2 [0; 1]:
In this particular model the reservation utility level u0 can be interpreted as the
minimum level of employment that has been …xed by the trade unions of the
industrial sectors.
The net cost in this particular model for having the industries in a coalition
S producing with a certain level of employment t; for given costs w 2 RN+ and
output level x (measured in money units), is
c(w; t; S; x) = ¡x + X
i2S
twi + ®t: (5)
The net cost is, then, the di¤erence between costs (given by
P
i2S
twi+®t) and the
income (given by x). For given costs w 2 RN+ and reservation utility u0 2 [0; 1],
the industrial planner’s problem can be written as follows:8>><>>:
min¡tv(S) + P
i2S
twi + ®t
s:t:
S ½ N;
u0 · t · 1:
We can relate its compensated demand correspondence with the best coali-
tions correspondence associated to the game. Consider …rst the following lemma,
which states the link between the expenditure function e(u0; w) and the indirect
function ¼(w).
Lemma 1 Consider a monotone TU-game (N ; v) with indirect function de-
noted by ¼. The minimum expenditure, e, for the industrial planner’s problem
on the induced coalition production economy satis…es the following two condi-
tions for all (u0; w) 2 [0; 1] £ RN+ :
(a) e(u0; w) = u0(® ¡ ¼(w)),
(b) e(u0; w) ¸ 0.
Proof. First of all, let us solve the industrial planner’s problem. Since
w 2 RN+ ; ® > v (N) and the game is monotone, for any S ½ N we have
¡v(S) + X
i2S
wi + ® > 0; (6)
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which implies that the minimum is attained at t = u0 and part (b). Now, the in-
dustrial planner’s problem, for given costs w, can be reduced to the computation
of
e(u0; w) = u0(® ¡ max
S½N
(
v(S) ¡ X
i2S
wi
)
):
By taking into account the de…nition of the indirect function in (1), we conclude
that
e(u0; w) = u0(® ¡ ¼(w));
which proves part (a), and hence the lemma.¥
Next, the main result of this section is proved; it provides a new economic
interpretation to the best coalitions correspondence of a monotone TU-game:
Proposition 2 . Consider a monotone TU-game (N ; v) with best coalitions
correspondence denoted by ©. The compensated demand function, ¾, for the in-
dustrial planner’s problem on the induced coalition production economy satis…es
the following condition:
¾(u0; w) = fu0g £ ©(w); 8(u0; w) 2 (0; 1] £ RN+ :
Proof. The proof is just a direct consequence of (4) and the previous lemma.
One has
¾(u0; w) =½
(t; S) 2 [0; 1] £ 2N : t ¸ u0; u0 (® ¡ ¼(w)) = t
µ
¡v(S) + P
i2S
wi + ®
¶¾
:
By (6), we can write
¾(u0; w) =
(
(u0; S) 2 [0; 1] £ 2N : u0 (® ¡ ¼(w)) = u0
Ã
¡v(S) + X
i2S
wi + ®
!)
;
that is, we have
¾(u0; w) = fu0g £ fS 2 2N : ¼(w) = v(S) ¡
X
i2S
wig;
implying that
¾(u0; w) = fu0g £ ©(w);
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which closes the proof of the proposition.¥
Note that from the nonemptiness of the best coalitions correspondence ©
at every w in RN we obtain that the compensated demand function takes
nonempty values everywhere. We can interpret any best coalitions correspon-
dence as a compensated demand function by making the Cartesian product with
the reservation utility level u0.
It is obvious that from this model we can recover the initial game (N ; v) from
the associated coalition production economy. Among all the games induced by
the model, f(N ; v¹;t)gt2[0;1], there is a particular one that coincides with the
initial game: One can easily check that (N ; v¹;1) is exactly the initial game;
indeed, by construction one has
v¹;1(S) = ¹(1; S) = v(S); 8S ½ N:
On the other hand, for the case of monotone TU-games (N ; v) the charac-
teristic function v can be reinterpreted from a di¤erent point of view. Using the
net cost function c and the expenditure function e of the minimization problem
of the industrial planner, the initial game is recovered. The following result
shows this fact:
Corollary 3 Consider a monotone TU-game (N ; v) and the expenditure func-
tion e of its associated industrial planner’s problem. Then, for any u0 in (0; 1]
and S ½ N , it holds that v(S) is the maximum real value ± for which
u0(¡± +
X
i2S
wi + ®) ¸ e(u0; w); 8w 2 RN+ :
Proof. From part (a) in the previous Lemma 1, we have
¼(w) = ® ¡ e(u0; w)
u0
; 8u0 2 (0; 1]; 8w 2 RN+ ;
whence, from (2), we derive
v(S) = min
w2RN+
(
® ¡ e(u0; w)
u0
+
X
i2S
wi
)
;
implying that v(S) is the maximum real value ± that satis…es
± · ® ¡ e(u0; w)
u0
+
X
i2S
wi; 8w 2 RN+ :
This closes the proof of this corollary.¥
Concerning the economic interpretation of this result, we can view the char-
acteristic function of the game at any coalition S, v(S), as the maximum output
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that coalition S can obtain with a higher net cost for the industrial planner than
the minimal one, given by e, for any given vector of costs w 2 RN+ and for any
given reservation utility level u0 in (0; 1].
An example:
Consider the following monotone TU-game (N ; v) with two productive sec-
tors:
v(f1; 2g) = 1;
v(f1g) = 13 ;
v(f2g) = 14 ;
v(;) = 0:
The induced production correspondence ¹, for every t 2 [0; 1], is given by
¹(t; f1; 2g) = t;
¹(t; f1g) = t3 ;
¹(t; f2g) = t4 ;
¹(t; ;) = 0:
For given ®, u0 > 0 and costs w = (16 ; 1) 2 R2+, the industrial planner’s problem
is written as follows: 8>><>>:
min ¡¹(t; S) + P
i2S
twi + ®t
s:t:
S ½ f1; 2g;
u0 · t · 1:
The solution to this problem is given by the expression
¾
µ
u0;
µ
1
6
; 1
¶¶
= fu0; f1gg ;
re‡ecting that, for these prices and costs, 1 is selected by the industrial planner
to be producing with an employment level equal to u0. In this example, the
minimum expenditure is given by
e
µ
u0;
µ
1
6
; 1
¶¶
= u0
µ
® ¡ 1
6
¶
¸ 0:
Finally, if we compute the indirect function ¼ at w =
¡1
6 ; 1
¢
, we obtain that
¼
µ
1
6
; 1
¶
=
1
6
;
and that the best coalitions correspondence © satis…es
©
µ
1
6
; 1
¶
= f1g :
One can easily check Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 for this particular selection of
costs.
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4.2 Coalition Production Economies Induced by NTU-
Games
The main di¤erence between this model and the previous one is that, in this
case, the coalition production economy is constructed from an initial NTU-game
(N; V ) instead of from a TU-game. For that NTU-game, we de…ne a coalition
production economy with di¤erentiated production and a public good where the
set N represents a set of industrial sectors in a society and the level of employ-
ment of the workers in this sectors is the public good associated to the economy.
The following three points make the main di¤erences between the two models:
(a) The induced production function of the TU-case is replaced by a correspon-
dence in the NTU-case: if V (S) ½ RS represents the set of vectors consisting of
di¤erent possible outcomes of each di¤erentiated good that can be produced by
the industries in coalition S ½ N when all workers are employed in these indus-
tries then, for some other …xed level of employment t 2 [0; 1], the production
of the good by S is assumed to be proportional to the level of employment; the
production correspondence of the coalition production economy is given by
¹(t; S) = t ¢ V 0(S) ½ RN :
(b) Each di¤erentiated good can be sold according to an exogenous vector of
prices ¸ 2 RN+ : if sector i 2 N produces a certain good then each unit of the
good can be sold at price ¸i 2 R+.
(c) For any coalition S, the cost function has as one of its arguments the output
vector x that can be selected from the set V (S) ½ RS (x will be denoted by x0
if it is embedded in RN by including zeros conveniently)
The net cost of the economic activity described in this model is given by
c(¸; w; t; S; x0) = ¡X
i2S
t¸ix0i +
X
i2S
twi + ®t;
we assume that V (N) ½ ®1N ¡RN+ : The net cost is, then, the di¤erence between
costs (given by
P
i2S
twi + ®t) and income (given by
P
i2S
t¸ix0i).
Since no other changes are introduced in the model, the industrial planner’s
problem for given prices ¸ 2 RN+ , costs w 2 RN+ and reservation utility u0 is
written as follows: 8>>>><>>>>:
min¡P
i2S
t¸ix0i +
P
i2S
twi + ®t
s:t:
t 2 [0; 1];
S ½ N;
x0 2 V 0(S);
U(t) ¸ u0:
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Note that, for this minimization problem, ¸, w and u0 are exogenously given
to the social planner, while t, S and x0 are endogenous. For simplicity, as in
the model of the preceding subsection it is also assumed that the social welfare
function is the identity.
Similarly to the TU-case, if we consider the industrial planner’s problem
induced by a monotone game, we obtain that the compensated demand corre-
spondence can be related to the best coalitions correspondence associated to the
game3 . Consider …rst the following preliminary result:
Lemma 4 Consider a compactly generated, comprehensive and monotone NTU-
game (N ;V ) with indirect function denoted by ¼. The minimum expenditure, e,
for the industrial planner’s problem satis…es the following conditions 8u0 2 [0; 1]
and 8(¸; w) 2 ¢:
(a) e(u0; (¸; w)) = u0(® ¡ ¼(¸;w)),
(b) e(u0; (¸;w)) > 0.
Proof. First of all, let us solve the industrial planner’s problem8>>>><>>>:
min t
µ
¡P
i2S
¸ix0i +
P
i2S
wi + ®
¶
s:t:
S ½ N;
x0 2 V 0(S);
u0 · t · 1:
Since prices and costs are in the set ¢ (see (3)), V (N) ½ ®1N ¡ RN+ and the
game is monotone, we have
¡X
i2S
¸ix0i +
X
i2S
wi + ® > 0; (7)
which implies that the minimum is attained at t = u0 and part (b). Now, the
industrial planner’s problem reduces to the computation of
e(u0; (¸; w)) = u0
Ã
® ¡ max
S½N; x02V 0(S)
X
i2S
(¸ix0i ¡ wi)
!
:
By taking into account the de…nition of the indirect function and the link be-
tween V and V 0, we conclude that
e(u0; (¸;w)) = u0(® ¡ ¼(¸;w)); (8)
which proves part (a), and hence the lemma.¥
The main result of this section is stated next; it provides a new economic
interpretation to best coalitions correspondences of NTU-games.
3This link is proved for costs and prices in the set ¢ (see (3)).
15
Proposition 5 Consider a compactly generated, comprehensive and monotone
NTU-game (N ;V ) with best coalitions correspondence denoted by ©. The com-
pensated demand function, ¾, of the industrial planner’s problem satis…es the
following condition:
¾(u0; (¸; w)) = fu0g £ ©(¸; w); 8u0 2 (0; 1]; 8(¸;w) 2 ¢:
Proof. The proof is just a direct consequence of Lemma 2. One has
¾(u0; (¸;w)) =
f(t; S; x0) : S ½ N; x0 2 V 0(S); u0 · t · 1 and
u0 (® ¡ ¼(¸; w)) = t
µ
¡P
i2S
¸ix0i +
P
i2S
wi + ®
¶¾
:
Since u0 6= 0, by (7) we can write
¾(u0; (¸; w)) =
f(u0; S; x0) : S ½ N; x0 2 V 0(S) and
u0 (® ¡ ¼(¸;w)) = u0
µ
¡P
i2S
¸ix0i +
P
i2S
wi + ®
¶¾
;
:
that is, we have
¾(u0; (¸; w)) =½
(u0; S; x0) : S ½ N; x0 2 V 0(S) and ¼(¸; w) = P
i2S
¸ix0i ¡
P
i2S
wi
¾
;
which implies that
¾(u0; (¸;w)) = fu0g £ ©(¸;w)
and then the proof of the proposition.¥
Note that the nonemptiness of the best coalitions correspondence © at every
(¸;w) in ¢ implies the nonemptiness of the compensated demand correspon-
dence. We can interpret any best coalitions correspondence as a compensated
demand function by doing a little change, namely, by making the Cartesian
product with the reservation utility level u0.
Again, it is obvious that from this coalition production economy we can ob-
tain the initial game (N ;V ) since both structures contain the same information.
Among all the games induced by the model, f(N; V¹;t)gt2[0;1], there is a par-
ticular one which coincides with the initial one. One can easily check that the
game (N ;V¹;1) is exactly the initial one, since by construction one has
V¹;1(S) = ¹(1; S) = V (S); 8S ½ N:
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On the other hand, for the case of monotone, compactly generated and
comprehensive NTU-games (N; V ) the characteristic mapping V can be rein-
terpreted from the point of view of the coalition production economy. Using the
net cost function and the expenditure function of the minimization problem of
the industrial planner, the initial game can be recovered. The following result
shows this fact:
Corollary 6 Consider a monotone, compactly generated and comprehensive
NTU-game (N ;V ) and its associated industrial planner’s problem. Then, for
any u0 in (0; 1], one has
V (S) =
©
x 2 RS : c(¸; w; u0; S; x0) ¸ e(u0; (¸; w)); 8 (¸;w) 2 ¢ª ; 8S ½ N:
Proof. From the duality between indirect functions and monotone, com-
pactly generated and comprehensive NTU-games, one has
V (S) =
(
y 2 RS : X
i2S
(¸iyi ¡ wi) · ¼(¸;w); 8(¸;w) 2 ¢
)
; 8S ½ N ;
after some simple arrangements, one can write
V (S) =
(
y 2 RS : u0
Ã
¡X
i2S
(¸iyi ¡ wi) + ®
!
¸ u0 (® ¡ ¼(¸;w)) ; 8 (¸;w) 2 ¢
)
:
Part (a) of Lemma 2 implies, jointly with the de…nition of c, that
V (S) =
©
x 2 RS : c(¸; w; u0; S; x0) ¸ e(u0; (¸; w)); 8 (¸;w) 2 ¢ª ;
which closes the proof of this corollary.¥
Concerning the economic interpretation that can be derived from this result,
we can view the characteristic mapping of a game at a coalition S, V (S), as
the set of output vectors each industry in S can obtain with a higher net cost
for the production planner than the minimum expenditure e, for any vector of
prices ¸ and costs w in the set ¢ and for any given …xed reservation utility level
u0 in (0; 1].
An example:
Consider the following compactly generated, comprehensive and monotone
NTU-game (N ;V ) with two industrial sectors:
V (f1; 2g) = ©(y1; y2) 2 R2 : y1 + y2 · 1 and y1; y2 · 1ª ;
V (f1g) = ©y 2 R : y · 13ª ;
V (f2g) = ©y 2 R : y · 13ª ;
V (;) = fy 2 R : y · 0g :
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The induced production correspondence ¹ is given by
¹(t; f1; 2g) = t ¢ V 0(f1; 2g);
¹(t; f1g) = t ¢ V 0(f1g);
¹(t; f2g) = t ¢ V 0(f2g);
¹(t; ;) = t ¢ V 0(;);
where V 0(S) denotes the usual representation of V (S) as a subset of RN . For
given ® and u0, and for (¸; w) = (23 ;
1
12 ;
1
6 ;
1
12 ) 2 ¢, the industrial planner’s
problem is given by8>>><>>>>:
min t
µ
¡( 23x01 + 112x02) +
P
i2S
wi + ®
¶
s:t:
S ½ f1; 2g;
x0 2 V 0(S);
u0 · t · 1:
Given u0 2 [0; 1]; the solution to this problem is given by
¾
µ
u0;
µ
2
3
;
1
12
;
1
6
;
1
12
¶¶
= f(u0; f1; 2g; (1; 0))g ;
re‡ecting that, for these prices and costs, both industries are selected together
by the industrial planner. In this example, the minimum expenditure is given
by
e
µ
u0;
µ
2
3
;
1
12
;
1
6
;
1
12
¶¶
= u0
µ
® ¡ 5
12
¶
¸ 0:
Finally, if we compute the indirect function ¼ at ¸ = (13 ;
1
3 ) and w = (
1
6 ;
1
6 ),
we obtain that
¼
µ
2
3
;
1
12
;
1
6
;
1
12
¶
=
5
12
;
and that the best coalitions correspondence © at the same point satis…es
©
µ
1
3
;
1
3
;
1
6
;
1
6
¶
= f(f1; 2g; (1; 0))g :
Now, one can easily check Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 for this particular
selection of prices and costs.
5 Conclusions and relationships to the litera-
ture
This paper, through its use of indirect and direct representations of games and
the concepts of compensated demand functions and expenditure functions from
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consumer demand theory has provided a new approach to representing games
as economies. This approach suggests other related questions and also other ap-
proaches. First, it appears that when a game is balanced or totally balanced we
may be able to obtain further relationships between the economies and games,
more precisely, between equilibrium outcomes of economies and cores of games;
research on this question is in progress. Another approach to the representation
of games as economic structures that appears very promising is the representa-
tion of the games as economies with local public goods, or, in other words, as
economies with clubs (cf. [3], [4] or [6]. For games with many players, another
approach based on revealed preference and integrability theory is suggested in
(??).
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